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Abstract 
By default, all major web browsing applications cache visited website content to the local disk 
to improve browser efficiency and enhance user experience. As a result of this action, the 
cache provides a window of opportunity for the digital forensic practitioner to establish the 
nature of the content which was hosted on the websites which had been visited. Cache content 
is often evidential during cases surrounding Indecent Images of Children (IIoC) where it is 
often assumed that cached IIoC is a record of the content viewed by a defendant via their 
browser. However, this may not always be the case. This article investigates web browser 
cache behaviour in an attempt to identify whether it is possible to definitively establish what 
quantity of cached content was viewable by a user following a visit to a website. Both the 
Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome browser caches are analysed following visits to 10 test 
websites in order to quantify cache behaviour. Results indicate that the volume of locally 
cached content differs between both web browsers and websites visited, with instances of 
images cached which would not have been viewable by the user upon landing on a website. 
Further, the number of cached images appears to be effected by how much of a website a 
user scrolls through. 
 
Keywords: Digital Forensics; Cache; Internet; Web Browser; Cache Forensics; Images De-
picting Child Sexual Abuse. 
 
1 Introduction 
The cache functionality of an Internet browser application is a well documented and discussed 
concept in the field of digital forensics (see The Chromium Projects, n.d.; Habben, 2015; 
Ritchie, 2012). Its job is to enhance a user’s web-browsing experience by downloading and 
storing a local version of website artefacts to provide increased efficiency in the re-rendering 
of a website on future visits (Howard, 2004). The cache can offer an insight into the browsing 
  
habits of a user, where although Internet history records may document the locations a user 
has visited online, the cache can reveal the content hosted on these webpages. Cached con-
tent can provide a vital source of evidence in many investigative scenarios and most notably, 
in investigations surrounding the possession, distribution and creation of Indecent Images of 
Children (IIoC) (see for example United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002)).  
 
Whilst at first glance, analysis of the cache may seem straightforward (in terms of understand-
ing the structure of its stored data), questions regarding its functionality are raised, particularly 
in relation to the volume of data which is cached and when caching occurs. To provide context 
to cache related investigatory issues, a discussion of regulatory concerns surrounding IIoC 
and the web browser cache is offered. In cases where IIoC are found in a defendant’s browser 
cache, cases often revolve around a defendant's knowledge of the cache in order to attribute 
some form of culpability over this content (Marin, 2008). In English law, liability for possession 
may ensue if a user knows of the cache (i.e. knows of its existence on their digital device), 
subject to legal tests of possession (see Atkins v DPP; Goodland v DPP [2000] 2 Cr. App. R. 
248) and statutory defences (see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA88), Section 160(2)). Of par-
ticular interest (if knowledge of the cache is established) is the CJA88 Section 160(2)(b), 
where a defendant may rely on a statutory defence if they can prove that they “had not himself 
seen the photograph [or pseudo-photograph] and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, 
it to be indecent”. In this situation, the requirement to have ‘not seen a photograph’ provides 
an area for exploration given that the cache is an automatic function, storing the content of 
visited websites. This defence requires establishing what a user has viewed on their screen, 
a task that during a post mortem investigation can only be established through analysis of 
cached data. Yet there is currently limited research analysing the functionality of web browser 
caches in terms of how much of a visited website is cached, and crucially in this context, 
whether it is possible to establish which (or if) content is cached without a user ever physically 
seeing it on their screen. Establishing with accuracy which cached files were viewable on 
screen and which were not, may support the application of the defence under CJA88 Section 
160(2)(b) (and equivalent international law regarding a defence involving sight) with a greater 
degree of reliability. 
 
This article provides a discussion of the functionality of the Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome 
Internet browsing applications, not from an information-parsing standpoint, but from a behav-
ioural context. The digital footprint left behind in the cache of each browser is examined and 
correlated against standard user browsing behaviour (both on landing and following a page 
scroll) in order to establish whether through cached-content, it is possible to identify which 
parts of a website were visually present on-screen and arguably viewed by a user.  
 
2 The Cache 
Although the structure of the cache differs between browsing applications (see discussions by 
Altheide and Carvey, 2011), its overarching functionality remains the same; to improve brows-
ing performance. Cache setups are configurable by the user or in some cases can be turned 
off (with performance detriments), however, by default, all mainstream browsing applications 
dedicate a region of local storage media for the caching of website artefacts which can include 
text, media, application and site structural content. As cache content is utilised in the rebuilding 
of websites by a browser upon a re-visit by the user, cache content can also support the offline 
rebuilding of webpage content during forensic investigations (see tools such as NetAnalysis 
  
(Digital Detective, 2017) and IEF (Magnet Forensics, 2017)). However, Casey (2009) ex-
presses the need for caution when undertaking such processes due to the potential for unre-
liable results due to the high turnover of files in the cache where multiple artefacts maybe 
similarly named and lead to inaccurately rebuilt pages. Even without cached page rebuilding, 
it may be possible to correlate the creation time and date of individual cached artefacts against 
Internet history records to identify websites which were visited and of evidential value. This is 
often a process involved in IIoC investigations where the Internet now often provides a main 
source of this material (Horsman, 2016).  
 
2.1 IIoC and the cache 
IIoC found in the Internet browser has been the subject to legal debate where arguments are 
offered both in terms of an offence of possession and that of making (Marin, 2008). The diffi-
culty lies with the fact that the function of a web-browser cache is automated by design, which 
subsequently allows imagery hosted on browsed websites to be collected and stored.  
 
The function of the cache is legitimate, but assigning culpability for its content poses issues. 
To determine whether a defendant is guilty of an offence of possession in regards to IIoC 
stored in their browser cache, a question of what constitutes a person having ‘possession’ of 
the cache’s content is crucial. In English law, a possession offence is offered under Section 
160 CJA88 where possession involves both a physical and mental element (CPS, 2017). To 
be in possession of cached images a defendant must have custody and control of the images 
(be able to retrieve/access them) and knowledge of the images following Atkins v DPP;  Good-
land v DPP [2000] 2 Cr. App. R. 248, where a defendant’s knowledge of the existence of the 
browser cache must be established. To try and simplify, a defendant cannot be in possession 
of an IIoC if they do not know about its presence on their system, and following R v Porter 
[2006] EWCA Crim 560, to have custody and control over an image, a defendant must be able 
to access that image. Where both knowledge and, ‘custody and control’ are established, a 
defendant is deemed to have possession of an image. In this instance, a defendant may seek 
to rely on one of the three statutory defences under the CJA88 Section 160(2) if they can 
prove (on the balance of probabilities) that they had a legitimate reason for possessing an 
image, that they had not seen the image or suspected it to be indecent, or finally, that the 
image was sent without any prior request and it was not kept an unreasonable amount of time 
(Wall, 2017). To circumvent the difficulties associated with establishing possession, particu-
larly involving the cache, where there is evidence of a deliberate intentional act (see R v 
Bowden [2000] 1 Cr. App. R. 438), such as searching for IIoC online, a charge of ‘making’ 
may be attributed. 
 
Under normal browsing circumstances consideration as to what a user of a web browser has 
actually physically seen on their screen is of little evidential value. Yet in cases of IIoC, the 
cache is assumed to be a record of what a defendant has viewed leading to potential liability, 
as noted above. Cached IIoC provide an insight into the severity of the offence committed 
(see CPS (2017) for categorisation and sentencing guidance), but limited consideration is 
given as to whether these images have actually been physically seen by a defendant. Argua-
bly this stems from a lack of complete understanding, not at a technical, but functional level of 
the web browser cache. Although the technical cache structure is relatively well documented 
(see The Chromium Projects, n.d.; Habben, 2015; Ritchie, 2012), often by those involved in 
forensic analysis, there is limited research available demonstrating the impact on the cache 
  
caused by standard user browsing actions. To place this in context, focus is drawn to the 
following quote by McBath (2012, p.389). 
 
"the first time a user visits a website two simultaneous processes occur: (1) the com-
puter opens the website and shows it on the screen, and (2) the computer creates 
a copy of all the data on that website and stores it in the cache. Thus, an image will 
not be stored in the cache unless the website from which it came was, at one time, 
on the computer screen….Images found in the cache are simply evidence of the 
prior possession that the defendant had when the images were on his screen” 
(McBath, 2012, p.389). 
 
This statement raises the following three generalisations regarding the cache which are argu-
ably in need of further investigation.   
 
1. “The computer creates a copy of all the data on that website and stores it in the cache”. 
2. “An image will not be stored in the cache unless the website from which it came, was 
at one time, on the computer screen”. 
3. “Images found in the cache are simply evidence of the prior possession that the de-
fendant had when the images were on their screen” (McBath, 2012, p.389). 
 
IIoC are a product used for sexual stimulation, which is arguably achieved when the imagery 
is physically viewed, an act often condemned (see dissenting comments in United States v. 
Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 258 (3d Cir. 2007) and McBath (2012)). Yet it may not be accurate to 
assume that cache content has always been visible to the user on their screen. Website struc-
tures vary greatly in shape and size and it remains a distinct possibility that users can visit a 
website and not physically witness all content hosted upon it without a thorough inspection. In 
addition, it is necessary to differentiate between a user who mistakenly visits a site and one 
who examines all content visually, where section 3 provides an analysis of the behaviour of 
the cache. 
 
3 Cache behaviour 
This article investigates the functionality of the Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox web 
browser cache in an attempt to establish whether a user's viewing behaviour in terms of on-
screen browser position and their scrolling actions (movement of the page on-screen), can be 
correlated to cached content. When the user visits a website, testing will explore the three 
statements extracted from McBath’s (2012) noted above in section 2.2 and the following re-
search question: 
 
‘Can we tell how much of a website has been actually viewed by a user?’ 
 
When taking into account the complexity in shape and size of modern website design, it is 
possible to visit a website but not visually witness all of its hosted content before moving on 
to another. The issue remains that in this situation, unseen components of the website may 
be cached and if these elements are IIoC, potential liability may occur and a defendant may 
be required to prove they had not seen the IIoC. This would require conclusively establishing 
how a cache functions when a particular suspect website was visited, and, correlating the 
volume of cache imagery to that found within a defendant’s cache against a set of test actions.   
 
  
In most investigations, the challenge lies with accurately establishing an understanding of 
suspect actions within their digital device. Often this must be done with limited knowledge of 
what a suspect has undertaken, and only the post-mortem remnants of their actions. Any 
accompanying explanation provided from a defendant may not be reliable, placing emphasis 
on the ability to interpret leftover remnants of data. In the case of cache analysis, a practitioner 
maintains elements of the cache from a particular site, with the challenge lying with determin-
ing which elements were seen. This issue can be summarised where a practitioner is pre-
sented with the statement of ‘I did not see the content stored on the website’. In some cases, 
evidence of visiting a particular website may be enough to prosecute. However, establishing 
how much of the website they viewed can differentiate between someone who truly mistakenly 
visits and someone who has taken additional time to view content, potentially providing evi-
dence of a defendant's mind set and intent.  
 
Section 3.1 provides a discussion of web browser positions and an example cache examina-
tion documenting resident cache content following a visit to www.bbc.co.uk/news. Section 3.2 
offers the results of 10 subsequent cache examinations following test website visits.    
 
3.1 Browser position 
A browser's position denotes what a user can see on their screen and provides a starting point 
for cache discussions. Given the diversity of website design, many domains maintain bespoke 
structures. Soasta in 2015 reported the average webpage to be around 2MB in size, (increas-
ing to around 3MB in 2017 (httparchive, 2017)) maintaining complex structural elements, 
which ultimately will impact the content which is cached locally. However, browser resolution 
dictates what a user sees on-screen upon first visit to a site (coined ‘on-landing’). This section 
of the website is often referred to as ‘above the fold’, a term derived from publishing industries 
and typically allows the top 600-1000 pixels (15.9*26.5cm) of a website to be viewed without 
scrolling (Miller, 2016). To provide an example, Figure 1 provides a visual (wireframe) break-
down of the images which are cached on-landing, above the fold from a visit to the 
‘www.bbc.co.uk/news' website. The dimensions of the bbc.co.uk/news webpage were 
141cm*31cm, converted from pixel measurements. Wireframe 1 highlights cached images by 
the Mozilla Firefox on-landing. Wireframe 2 documents cached images by the Chrome 
browser on-landing. The red line indicates the bottom of the screen, where content above was 
viewable by the user on landing. Red blocks indicate a hosted website image which was 
cached by the browser. Yellow blocks indicate a hosted image which was not cached by the 
browser. 
  
 
 
Figure 1. A wireframe representation of cached content by the Mozilla Firefox (1) and 
Google Chrome (2) web browsers on landing upon the www.bbc.co.uk/news page 
(taken on 01.05.17 at 13:31).   
 
Figure 1 offers an indication of the volume of image content cached upon landing on a website, 
without interacting with it. As can be seen, imagery beyond the view of the user is  cached, 
where in the case of Firefox, a user would need to scroll to the bottom of the site in order to 
visually witness all images which were cached on landing. 
 
Figure 2 denotes the impact on the browser cache after a user scrolls down to view additional 
content on the page. The red lines indicate the new position of the screen, where approxi-
mately 30% of the website has been scrolled (45cm). Green blocks indicate any additionally 
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Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the cache for each bowser reacts dynamically to the movement 
of the webpage itself and does not cache the entirety of the page on landing. This dynamic 
caching process ensures efficiency, preventing a user’s browser cache from saving redundant 
website artefacts and overloading the local disk drive storage. However, from an evidential 
standpoint (bar the four images cached by Firefox at the bottom of the page), it is possible to 
identify an initial correlation between images cached and the user’s view of the webpage on-
screen, where the more of the page viewed, the more imagery is cached. Yet the caching of 
unseen imagery still provides an investigatory issue and it cannot be confirmed that all cached 
imagery would have been seen by a user. The examination of the cache following visits to 
www.bbc.co.uk/news highlights the challenges it poses in relation to the four cached image at 
the bottom of the website. These images are cached regardless of behaviour on landing when 
using the Mozilla Firefox browser but not cached on landing with Chrome. This appears to 
suggest that different browser caching algorithms may result in different volumes of cached 
content for the same website visit. Only following a complete scroll (100%) to the bottom of 
the web page, were all images present on the website were cached by both browsers.  
 
To provide an overview, Table 1 provides a breakdown of Figures 1 and 2.   
 
Table 1: A breakdown of cache statistics for the visit to www.bbc.co.uk/news 
 
3.2 Testing & Results   
Following the example provided in section 3.1, this section builds upon this work providing an 
analysis of the volume of image content cached from 10 test website visits in two scenarios, 
on-landing and after a 30% scroll. The results of caching by Google Chrome (version 58.0) 
and Mozilla Firefox (version 53.0) with a screen resolution of 1440*900, from 10 selected test 
websites, ranging in size and structure (to provide test diversity), are offered in Table 2. Test-
ing was carried out in May 2017, with results consistent with website structures at this point in 
time. Testing took place on the Windows 10 platform. 
 
Before testing, each browser’s cache was cleared using the browser’s in-built cleaning func-
tionality. This was verified manually by locating and viewing the content of both browser’s 
cache folder to confirm no content was present and via Nirsoft’s ChromeCacheView 
(http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/chrome_cache_view.html) and MozillaCacheView(http://www.nir-
soft.net/utils/mozilla_cache_viewer.html) forensic cache viewing applications (the focus of 
testing remained solely on live content). This ensured that no live cache content existed before 
each test website visit, preventing test contamination. For each visit, the web address for the 
site was inserted directly into the address bar and initiated following immediate loading of the 
web browser. To minimise impact on the cache, both browsers had their homepage set to 
‘www.google.co.uk’ to prevent large volumes of images being cached from additional sources 
other than each test site, with any Google logo imagery being discounted from final test quan-
tification of imagery. Once the page had indicated a complete load, cached image content was 
forensically extracted from each browser’s resident cache folder (Chrome:- C:\Users\@@\Ap-
pData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cache and Firefox:- C:\Users\@@\Ap-
pData\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\@@\cache) using Nirsoft’s appropriate tool 
(Chrome/Mozilla viewer) to a wiped removable device for visual interpretation and manual 
quantification. After each collection process, results were recorded and the cache was cleared 
and verified using the above process to prevent cache-contamination between tests, and the 
whole process repeated.  
  
 
 
 
To provide a comprehensive overview of cache behaviour, Table 2 offers a breakdown of 
cache behaviour based on 10 randomly selected test websites.  
 
Table 2: Cache behaviour documented from 10 website visits. 
 
3.3 Cache behaviour analysed 
The breakdown of results in Table 2 document the behaviour of the cache on both landing 
and via a 30% website scroll, designed to simulate a user who does not simply visit and leave 
a site, but take time to analyse content hosted upon it. Of the 10 websites analysed, both the 
size of the websites and the amount of imagery hosted on them vary in order provide diverse 
test data and simulate the impact of interactions with websites of different structure and length. 
Further, these sites are legitimate sites, not illegal sites (which would not be possible to test 
due to legal restrictions); yet still provide an insight into how the cache reacts to various web-
site sizes and structures. Focus is maintained on quantifying cached imagery to simulate an 
IIoC investigation where imagery and thumbnails from hosted video content may be cached.  
 
Although testing has focused on single website visits, a multiple website visit scenario has 
been considered. It should be noted that when a site was re-visited (an initial visit of a website, 
followed by a closure of the browser tab, reopen then revisit the webpage), typically two sce-
narios may occur. Where no changes to the website hosted imagery have occurred between 
the first visit and re-visit, typically no additional images are cached (for example, 30 images 
cached on first visit, 0 on the re-visit). Where a site has updated its content between visits, 
this additional imagery may be cached if it is in a location on the site which sits within a cache-
able area. 
 
3.3.1 Results on Landing 
Of the 10 sites tested, only 3 (sites 1,2 & 4) cached all resident media on landing. As a result, 
sites 1 and 4 maintained the highest percentage of images cached which were not viewable 
by the user upon landing on the site. Of the remaining sites, volumes of cached imagery varied 
greatly, ranging from between 8 - 83%. Rates of caching could not be correlated to site size, 
and as a result, there is no consistent approach which can be adopted to determining how 
much of a site has been viewed by a defendant on landing. Although dependant on site design, 
in eight tests (excluding 3 & 5), website images were cached but not seen on landing. 
 
3.3.2 On-scroll   
For testing, a 30% scroll was implemented, simulating a user who lands on a website then 
proceeds to examine approximately a third of the content. In all cases (bar 1,2 & 4 which 
cached all images on landing) an increase in the number of images cached was witnessed. In 
addition, only cases 3, 5 (only Chrome) and 8 (only Firefox) resulted in all cached images 
being visible on-screen to a user after a 30% scroll. In all other cases, website images had 
been cached, but were not viewable to the user on-screen. The on-scroll testing however 
appears to suggest a correlation between the amount of the web page scrolled through (and 
therefore viewable) and the number of images cached regarding the chosen test sites and 
  
web browsers. Although limitations regarding the size of testing carried out must be acknowl-
edged, such inferences regarding scrolling vs. volume of images cached may be applicable in 
wider usage. 
 
3.4 The impact of screen resolution  
The results of table 2 suggest a link between viewable screen content and cached content. 
As a result, consideration of a user's screen resolution should be taken into account when 
attempting to establish cached content. Figure 3 provides an example comparison of cached 
content where a screen resolution of 1366*768 (1) vs. 1024*768 (2) is used. To provide an 
example test the Chrome browser is used. Not only does resolution have an impact on the 
volume of content seen on landing, but two additional images (18 vs. 16 images) are cached 
when a the larger screen resolution is utilised. As a result, screen resolution settings should 
also be taken into account when quantifying cached content during an investigation and con-
sidering what may have been physically seen by a user.  
 
  
Figure 3: Wireframe 1 shows cached imaged using a screen resolution of 1366*768. 
Wireframe 2 shows cached imaged using a screen resolution of 1024* 768. 
 
4 The Impact of testing on IIoC investigations 
Following the testing documented in Table 2, it is clear that the cache presents an investiga-
tory challenge in relation to IIoC and the presence of an image in the cache does not mean 
this has been physically viewed. This issue is noted by Herczeg (2014, p76-77). 
 
“Prosecuting someone for simply viewing websites containing child pornography im-
ages could lead to absurd and unfair results. It could mean that someone who acci-
dentally or out of curiosity clicks on a link that takes him to child pornography mate-
rial could be prosecuted for the act of viewing it. In order to avoid this risk, law en-
forcement should take into account evidence showing that the viewing of such ma-
terial was accidental or otherwise unintentional. The prosecutor would look for ex-
ample at the amount of the images stored into the cache file in order to determine if 
the Internet user was actively looking for child pornography or merely "stumbled" on 
the website” (Herczeg, 2014, p.76-77). 
 
Fitzpatrick (2012, p915) states that “prosecutors often turn to the presence of temporary In-
ternet files on the defendant's computer to show that by viewing the images; the defendant 
came to possess them because the computer generated the temporary Internet files”. In 
United States v. Kain, 589 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2009), forensic expert ‘Detective Mize (at 948) 
described ‘temporary internet’ files as locations where the computer temporarily stores web 
pages that were previously viewed’ where the Court of Appeal held that ‘the presence of child 
pornography in temporary internet and orphan files on a computer's hard drive is evidence of 
prior possession of that pornography’ (at 950). This was interpreted by McBath (2012, p393) 
to mean the following; 
 
“Thus, the court held the evidence that the defendant possessed the images while 
the images resided on his computer screen to be sufficient, and copies of these 
images ultimately located in the cache were simply probative of that earlier view-
ing...In other words, the defendant's crime was complete at the moment he viewed 
the images on his monitor” (McBath, 2012, p393). 
 
Yet the issue with these commentaries lies with the blanket assumption that cached content 
is proof of viewed content, where this interpretation of the cache cannot always be relied upon. 
Such sentiment is echoed by Gant (2012) who indicates that cached content is not on its own, 
evidence of viewed content, yet regularly this is assumed to be the case. Establishing whether 
a user has physically seen an IIoC on a website poses an investigatory issue and one which 
must be addressed by a forensic practitioner. This is an issue where a user visits a website 
but hosted imagery is not viewable on landing, meaning that in absence of any scrolling, they 
may move on to another site and never realise they had visited a site containing IIoC and that 
they had been cached. This issue also potentially exists with regards to determining the se-
verity of an offence, where more severely categorised IIoC may exists on parts of a website 
which had not been viewed by a suspect upon landing, but had been subsequently cached.  
 
Table 2 documents the relationship between scrolling and caching. All content which was 
viewable on-screen at any one time was cached in all test cases. However, the issue remains 
  
that a percentage of unseen website imagery is also cached. This content is unquantifiable in 
the sense that it differs from website to website, and therefore it is not possible to establish 
definitively from a post mortem analysis of cached files alone to identify which files were 
viewed.  
 
What is key to note is that every website may and likely will behave differently, therefore where 
a question of viewing IIoC is raised, control tests must be carried out on a site in question 
(subject to requisite legislation permitting recognisance on a known illegal site) to scrutinise 
the cache behaviour, replicating a defendant's browser setup and potential movements. Even 
in such cases, it may not be possible with the requisite accuracy needed to establish a factual 
account of the user’s ‘viewing’ actions, particularly where a site has subsequently changed 
after a defendant has been arrested and devices seized. Testing within this work took place 
on legitimate mainstream websites, providing an indication as to how browser caches perform 
in these circumstances. Cache behaviour regarding indecent websites, which may employ 
less common structures are likely to impact cache behaviours. A limitation of this work is the 
inability to examine browser cache behaviour following indecent website visits, and only an 
inference can be made with regards to scrolling and the volume of images being cached. 
Further testing would be needed, and given the diversity of potential website structures avail-
able (where some IIoC websites may be archaic or akin to websites which stem from a single 
host configuration), each case would almost certainly be in need of testing specific to each 
website. 
 
To summarise, Table 2 allows the following assumptions to be made. 
 
1. When a website is visited for the first time, not all of the website’s imagery con-
tent may be cached in all cases.  
2. Imagery which has not been visible on-screen is cached, meaning it is not pos-
sible to reliably establish whether a user has seen imagery cached from a web-
site visit, from an analysis of the cache alone. Testing must be undertaken on 
a suspect website in question, in order to try and replicate the suspect’s cache 
and correlate this to associated actions. 
3. When a user scrolls through more of a websites content, this will likely increase 
the volume of content cached from the website. 
 
4.1 The impact on CJA88 Section 160(2)(b) 
The inability to definitively identify which images have been viewed by a user on-screen may 
cast doubt on the applicability of the defence under CJA88 Section 160(2)(b) in relation to IIoC 
in the cache. A defence which suggests reliance on establishing ‘sight’ needs to be supported 
by reliable evidence of what content has been shown to a defendant on screen. Given that 
this is likely not possible, arguably the application of this defence should be treat with caution. 
Following legal literature, the presence of an assumption that cached files are viewed files 
may prevent a defendant from relying on the defence in this scenario. However it remains a 
viable possibility, where the host site responsible for the cached imagery must have its struc-
ture thoroughly investigated before any assumptions on sight can even be considered. Simi-
larly, concerns are also raised about the use of a possession offence in relation to the cache, 
as it is feasible to know of the cache (making a defendant potentially liable for its content), but 
  
never realise that it contains IIoC as they may have never been seen on-screen. This poten-
tially raises issues of inconsistency of the application of possession related offences in cache 
contexts.  
 
5 Conclusions 
This article is one of the first studies to examine the functionality of the Google Chrome and 
Mozilla Firefox browser caches in an attempt to assess the possibility of identifying which 
browser cached images have been physically viewed by a user on-screen. Testing has high-
lighted inconsistent cache behaviour, meaning that it may not possible to make an accurate 
assumption of which images were viewed by a user based on cached content alone. Whilst 
this work has focused on mainstream website testing, it has allowed inferences regarding 
cached content volumes and links to website scrolling to be established, which may be appli-
cable in cases involving sites hosting IIoC. 
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